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Closing Keynote 
Robbie Duschinsky and Ian Robson 
University of Northumbria  
Morality, Colour, Bodies: Epistemological and 
Interpretive Questions of Purity 
Introduction 
Responses to the idea of purity in this special edition are wonderfully diverse 
and contribute towards a welcome discussion of the topic. In offering a range 
of perspectives on different themes, they avoid a canonical statement about 
purity, but offer lines of enquiry. They amply demonstrate purity and impurity 
as an issue of contemporary relevance: for the politics of nation states, in 
cosmetic and reproductive technologies, projects of the state, of the body, of 
finance and media, in ambiguous and contested cyberspace, popular culture 
and beyond. Activities in all of these areas are shaped by implicit 
understandings and practices that relate to purity, variously expelling, carving, 
distributing and representing human and material processes in hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic ways.  
The contributions to this special issue do not only trace historical and 
present-day forms of purity discourse, but challenge some of its superficial and 
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hegemonic presentations in exploring different forms of social practice. 
Attending to the practice of historical inquiry in her contribution, Susan 
Currell draws attention to what she terms the ‘confusions and delusions of the 
discourses of purity’ and their oppressive and violent deployment. Currell 
attends to the significant role these discourses have played in both twentieth-
century American social and eugenic policies, a finding which is in line with 
research addressing other countries (e.g. Mottier, 2008). As well as presenting 
insightful observations on this topic, she also offers meta-reflections for those 
interested to theorise purity within history. Her premise, fully evidenced by 
her own scholarship addressing documentary photographs, is that there is no 
untainted record of facts or events, waiting to be uncovered in a neutral way by 
the researcher: ‘History of course, is not “pure”: but we need to face the 
inadequacy of the historical method that reconstructs the past using only 
fragments obtained from documents created by those whose voices are already 
privileged over their subjects (academics, politicians, artists for example). How 
do we refute those dominant narratives without privileging our own? ’. 
Currell’s question, of how to respond to the complicity of historical method 
and its asymptotic distance of the evidence from the truth has been a question 
asked countless times. It was, in fact, Marx and Engels who first framed this 
question as a distinction between ‘pure history’ and ‘impure history’, in the 
German Ideology ([1864] 1976, p.164). Currell not only offers a distinctive 
answer to this question, but also gives an elegant demonstration of how it 
might work in practice: ‘One way that we might proceed is to question and 
prod the gaps – explore the binaries and unity of opposites such as white and 
trash – expose the imperfections and impurities of historical evidence’. Currell 
is suggesting that we can best acknowledge the impurity of historical, or for 
that matter sociological, evidence by prodding the gaps in existing narratives. 
Topics come to our attention because they are already situated in some way as 
intelligible, if perhaps opaque or contradictory. Exposing the terms of that 
intelligibility as a method acknowledges that we begin from an already partly 
constituted horizon, but suggests that we can advance through questioning the 
terms of this intelligibility.  
Sociological, anthropological and ethnographic literature dealing with the 
theory of visual images (Henare et al., 2006; Belton, 2011) draws attention to 
the sites of the production, image and audience for images, and how our 
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bodies experience images. Considering Currell’s discussion of photographic 
images, and the encouragement to ‘prod the gaps’, exposure in this context can 
be taken to mean the control of light hitting a photographic film, between the 
time the shutter is released and the time it is closed again, in order to produce 
visible detail. Perfect light or perfect absence of light are incapable of 
producing textures on a photographic film, and as such cannot support 
intelligible meanings. Instead, it is the imperfections of available light—
between pristine light and pristine darkness—which produce this texture 
(Nancy 1991). Exposure is an operation performed upon this finitude, shaping 
it in order to achieve visually intelligible shapes, tones and contrasts. It is by 
crafting this finitude by selection and exposure control that the potential for 
meaning is achieved. Similarly, other aspects of photography such as 
composition expose the contingent nature of purity; visual elements have 
meaning in relation to other elements, images themselves are presented in 
particular sequences and utilise narrative conventions, and imperfections in 
images themselves testify to authenticity. Through such crafting, different 
ways become possible of turning the singular event—available to us only in 
imperfect light—into an account, of turning the openness of ourselves as 
researchers into the production of something marked, limited and new.   
 In her analysis of the use of documentary photography to support 
eugenic discourse, Currell observes that ‘the photo portrays an absence, makes 
present that which it tries to hide and hides what it is truly showing’ . Eugenic 
purity and impurity in human beings is not visible, and as such leans upon 
other forms of signification in order to appear as a certain basis for public 
policy (and for individual sexual choices).  A photograph of a dilapidated 
house, with dirty occupants, can make visible eugenic impurity, even whilst in 
order to be plausible it must hide the production of this visibility out of an 
image which could readily have quite alternate meanings. Currell refers to ‘the 
dialectics of purity’ in this context, highlighting that close attention to purity 
and impurity discourses in their situated operation will allow the researcher to 
see the forces which both allow these discourses to subsist and persuade, and 
which can reveal the contradictions and constructions upon which they 
necessarily rest.  
The discussion of purity itself is something that benefits from an exposure 
of the terms of its intelligibility. As contributors to this special edition show in 
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different ways, purity itself is a less stable concept than may first appear. This 
insight, however, is not always reflected in dominant theory on the topic. 
Contributions to this special edition are therefore placed in dialogue with a 
metanarrative regarding the role of purity in Western history, presented by the 
influential Harvard sociologist Barrington Moore Jr.. In effect, discussion of 
Moore’s narrative on purity is a way to expose it differently, allowing the 
reader to consider Moore’s claims about the defining role of purity as he sees it 
in the Hebrew Bible. In turn, we hope that the special issue’s contributions will 
be exposed differently in light of work to refine and redefine Moore’s 
overarching thesis. As Udo Simon (2012, pp.31, 34) has argued, contemporary 
research is not well-served by what he calls the ‘remarkable’ disparity between 
the limited theory developed to date on the topic of purity and impurity, and 
the pressing fact that ‘purity rhetorics are still part of the daily life of the 
individual and in public discourses’ in both industrialised and post-
industrialised societies. 
Moral Purity and Persecution 
Among existing theory on the topic of purity and impurity, one major account 
is that of the Harvard sociologist Barrington Moore, Jr. (2000). In Moral 
Purity and Persecution in History, Moore proposes that the Hebrew Bible, ‘the 
moral template of Western civilisation’, assigned a monopoly of grace and 
virtue to its adherents, making relations with any other human beings ‘fierce 
and cruel’ (2000, p.x, 3). He suggests that monotheistic religion will 
necessarily and inevitably produce discourses of moral purity, which demand 
the elimination of impurity, since they equate diversity with evil in their 
conception of a single God. Citing Leviticus 5:2, which states that a person 
touching the carcass of an unclean animal is both ‘unclean and guilty’, Moore 
proposes that this framework fully aligned impurity with guilt, producing an 
ideology of ‘moral purity’, ‘a monotheistic invention that has been with us for 
centuries’ (2000, p.12). 
From this historical foundation in Biblical monotheism, moral purity and 
impurity have ‘become the basis for political and religious action in Western 
and Central Europe’, contributing to intolerance and extremism through the 
absolutist world-view that they mandate (2000, p.x). Using comparative 
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historical methods, Moore addresses the cultural specificity of this notion of 
purity and impurity. Other societies use these ideas, he states, but do they 
form exclusivist ideologies of moral purity? Examining Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Confucianism, prior to substantial Western impact, Moore concludes that 
whilst purity and impurity discourses are present, they do not operate as 
characterisations of moral perfection or abjection: ‘missing or very weakly 
developed in China are the two basic themes in the Western theory and 
practice of moral purity. First is the otherworldly sanction for “our” moral 
purity, be it God, revolutionary faith, or the mythic Aryan race… Second is a 
strongly developed notion of pollution that makes the impure and the 
unbelievers into a mysterious dehumanised threat that must, if at all possible, 
be rooted out for the sake of preserving “our” moral purity’ (2000, p.128). 
As such, ‘For the Western world, and only the Western world, we can 
discern a line of historical causation that begins with the monotheism of the 
ancient Hebrews; runs through the heresies of early Christianity, the 
slaughters of the Crusades, the Inquisition, and the Reformation; turns secular 
in the French Revolution, and culminates in… Nazism’ (2000, p.26). Moore’s 
narrative does not imply that this cultural heritage is limited to Western 
societies today. With imperialism and globalisation, moral purity discourses 
have spread widely. Thus Moore notes that whereas purity and impurity in 
India used to organise caste hierarchies in which the most polluted did the 
dirtiest and most strenuous work, in recent years these discourses have 
increasingly been used within movements for whom there is no possible place 
for pollution.  
Moore’s argument is strident. It draws attention to three valuable facets of 
purity and impurity discourses. First, he draws a distinction between ritual 
purity and moral purity, proposing that they operate quite differently. He 
suggests that only moral purity is an absolutist discourse, distinguishing in 
black-and-white terms the meaning and worth of human beings. Second, 
Moore situates moral purity discourses in history. This differs from the work of 
Mary Douglas (1966, pp.43-4), for example, for whom purity and impurity 
attends any breach of the social or categorical boundaries of a society, and for 
whom ‘the difference between pollution behaviour in one part of the world and 
another is only a matter of detail’. By contrast, Moore suggests that moral 
purity and impurity discourses are culturally contingent. Moore’s account can 
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explain, for example, why Hang Lin’s fascinating contribution to this special 
issue, discussing Confucianism, does not explicitly mention purity and 
impurity: Moore states that whilst concepts of ritual and aesthetic purity exist 
in Confucianism, this ‘contrasts sharply with the divine sanction found in the 
three monotheistic religions of the West and Near East. It is one important 
reason for the near absence of a militant moral purity in classical 
Confucianism’ (2000, p.123). Third, however, Moore makes an important 
point when he suggests that the heritage of Western societies in the 
construction of moral purity and impurity may have purchase, mutatis 
mutandis, in organising non-Western discourses to the degree that they 
selectively incorporate and reconstitute Western discourses of moral purity. 
However, Moore’s account also has significant flaws. In its totalising 
narrative, it too often neglects the plurality of influences on the use of purity 
and impurity discourses, and too often forces their appearance and form in 
contexts where they are not invoked (Birnbaum, 2003). This point can be 
illustrated with the case of Biblical monotheism. In support of his 
metanarrative, Moore considers Leviticus 10:10, in which God instructs Aaron 
on behalf of the Israelites that they ‘must distinguish [ulahavdil] between holy 
and unholy, and between unclean and clean’. This text appears to run quite 
counter to Moore’s account, since it implies that purity and impurity cannot be 
reduced to a mere characterisation of good and bad, and that the two 
oppositions not only have been but should be distinguished from one another. 
Moore counters such a reading by proposing that there is ultimately no 
difference between good/evil and pure/impure in the text, since ‘impurity 
remains the decisive threat, and certainly a moral one, because it is a threat to 
holiness’ (2000, p.14). Moore’s interpretation, however, not only runs counter 
to the ostensive meaning of the verse—Ulahavdil is an injunction to separate; 
the term for separation used is the one which elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible 
designates an ontological or categorical distinction (e.g. Genesis 1:4-7 between 
darkness and light, heavens and earth). Moore’s account also runs counter to 
the tide of specialist scholarly literature on purity and impurity in the Hebrew 
Bible, further suggesting that the binary account of purity he draws from 
scripture also requires re-examination. 
There are, scholars have argued, two currents of purity and impurity 
classification in the Hebrew Bible. One current situates impurity as bad; the 
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other wishes to avoid contact between impurity and the Temple, as the site at 
which imminent existence meets transcendence, but otherwise treats impurity 
as an inevitable part of human existence and without moral valence. Klawans 
(2000, p.23) specifically draws out that whilst some forms of impurity are 
perceived as avoidable, evil and more or less indelible, there are sources of 
impurity considered in the Hebrew Bible which are ‘(1) more or less 
unavoidable. (2) It is not sinful to contract these impurities. And (3) these 
impurities convey an impermanent contagion’. A key distinction is that where 
impurity is perceived as avoidable and evil it is not perceived by the biblical 
text as contagious; whereas where purity is perceived as unavoidable and not 
in itself sinful, it has the problem of causing contagion through touch. Linking 
these two different schemas of purity and impurity, there is a concern, 
expressed in Leviticus 15:31, that both kinds of impurity run some risk of 
contaminating the Temple. In any case, however, already from the Hebrew 
Bible itself purity and impurity discourses can be observed which do not obey 
the eliminationist schema which Moore theorises originated in the Hebrew 
Bible and subsequently dominated Western culture. A current of purity and 
impurity discourse in the Bible sees impurity as an integral part of human life, 
and not as bad in itself:  
Consideration of the plain meaning of the scriptural verses relating to impurity 
contravenes the notion that impurity is always regarded as a forbidden state ab 
initio. After all, bodily impurities, including corpse contamination, are an 
inescapable component of daily life. Scripture recommends no apotropaic 
precautions for approaching impurity, neither for childbirth nor for burial, for 
example; nor does it condemn voluntarily contracted impurity, as through 
marital relations. Indeed, the few verses warning against impurity, or stating a 
punishment for its incurrence, are primarily directed at preventing contact 
between impurity and consecrated persons, objects, or places. (Noam, 2008, 
p.471) 
 
Yet the plurality of purity discourse in the Hebrew Bible can be countered by 
Moore with the claim that only one form matters. Here again we can identify 
the consequences of a binary account of moral purity: he argues that ‘the long, 
long route from the ancient Hebrews to Stalinism was a river of social 
causation’ and ‘despite all the twisting and turning of historical debris, the 
river has a clear identity and an obvious ending point in twentieth-century 
totalitarian movements’ (2000, p.26). In short, historical diversity is 
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epiphenomenal. In this way, Moore falls subject to just the purifying 
manoeuvre he is intent to diagnose: he clears away what appears to him to be 
mere historical dross or debris, to see the ‘clear identity’ of purity and impurity 
as a pure river of ideas beneath phenomena, experiences, texts and events. In 
one of many examples, Moore notes awkwardly that popular Calvinism made 
no use of purity and impurity discourses that he could discover; nonetheless he 
asserts that ‘an implicit distinction between pure and impure remained basic 
to the whole Calvinist position’ (2000, p.48), and that as such ‘the entire 
Catholic ritual, with its belief in the real presence of Christ in the Mass, the 
veneration of relics, the cult of the Virgin, etc. formed a poisonous pollution of 
the true faith, to be rooted out by any possible means’ (2000, p.55).  
In Moore’s hands purity and impurity waver between a discourse actually 
used by organisations and societies, and an interpretive framework which can 
be used to analyse events where no explicit discursive appeal to purity and 
impurity is made. This wavering, indeed, appears to be the condition of his 
strongest claims that moral purity and impurity are of foundational 
importance across Western societies, in producing ‘moral approval for cruelty’ 
(2000, p.57). Moore himself worries that ‘in an inquiry such as the present 
one, the investigator nearly always finds what he is looking for, a discovery 
that by itself may be worthless’, and urges further work to ‘learn not  only what 
notions of purity-impurity were current but also to acquire some sense of their 
importance in current thinking and political action’ (2000, p.76). Drawing 
upon and integrating the contributions to this special issue, this article will 
engage in such work, aiming to achieve a different and deeper theory of purity 
discourses than that presented by Moore. In his text, Moore highlights the 
themes of truth, morality and embodiment as crucial for Western purity 
discourses, but he offers no analysis of why purity and impurity are tied to 
these themes. Our analysis will attend to each in turn on the way to an 
improved account of how purity and impurity discourses, as Moore rightly 
states, often play a role in black-and-white worldviews. 
Moore is quite disparaging about ‘purity’: in his work, ‘impurity receives 
far more attention than its opposite. It is also rather more interesting’ (2000 , 
p. ix). The neglect of purity, in favour of analysis of impurity, has been a 
common feature of studies of the topic to date (e.g. Caillois [1950], 1959; 
Kristeva [1980], 1982). Our own view is that purity, reconsidered, offers rich 
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potential for study. To remain with a scriptural imaginary, to wrestle with the 
angel of purity is complex and uncomfortable but ultimately stages an 
encounter which is not empty. Pursuit of fresh ways of understanding and 
applying ideas of ‘Purity’ stem from the title of the Excursions 
Journal/University of Sussex conference from which the contributions to the 
special issue originated. Contributors have interrogated this theme in topics as 
diverse as the propaganda of eugenics, putrefaction and death, colour, popular 
culture and the morality of banking. In agreement with these contributors, our 
own position is that future exploration of the subject of purity, including its 
constructive, relational and ethical dimensions, offers rich grounds for 
thought.  Whereas Moore (2000, p.3) perceives purity as defined by what it is 
not ‘namely, impurity or pollution’, we will attend to the specific meanings  
associated with purity. Our analysis will begin by reconsidering whether purity 
and impurity discourses have the ‘clear identity’ that Moore wishes to ascribe 
to them, looking at variation in their epistemological status through attention 
to themes raised by the contributions to the special issue. 
Purity and truth  
In her contribution to the special issue, Rebecca Downes suggests that ‘purity 
suggests flawlessness; it is an ideal and an abstraction, opposed to the real, the 
actual, the physical’. This is an elegant formulation, with much value as a 
characterisation of the way that purity and impurity have figured death and 
corpses. In addition to considering purity as a contrast of ideal and material, 
we consider the possibilities for purity as situated, with both material and ideal 
features. To do this, we borrow from the world of physical sciences and take 
the case of the metal element zinc. Rather than absolute flawless presence or 
absolute flawless absence—either of which would kill us (through zinc toxicity 
or zinc deficiency)—the human body requires trace amounts of zinc for the 
operation of many of the key proteins and enzymes required for manufacturing 
new cells.  
Zinc (Zn) is pure whereas zinc oxide (ZnO) and zinc blende (ZnS), its 
common compounds, are impure. Like Currell’s eugenic purity, pure zinc 
never occurs without human support and intervention. We are forced to 
challenge our ideas about purity. If purity refers to an ideal and an abstraction, 
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this does not mean that it is mere ideal and abstraction. There is surely value 
in being able to assign a different epistemological status to eugenics and 
material science discourses. Since the seventeenth century, various methods 
have been used to smelt—extract—zinc from its oxide without it immediately 
escaping as vapour (Craddock, 1998). Scientific discourse situates such an 
extraction as an act which achieves pure zinc, deploying the assumption that 
metallic zinc is an ‘element’, an immutable essence defined by the number of 
protons in the nucleus of the atom (its distinctive atomic number) and 
expressed in any instantiation of zinc to the extent that it is free from mixture. 
We will never see, hear, or touch zinc in its form as an element any more than 
we can eugenic purity. It is always partly constructed by the material and 
discursive conditions of scientific practice (such as its price). Yet the 
distinctive atomic number of the element zinc gives it a more credible claim to 
being the basis for the assessment of actually occurring zinc compounds in 
terms of their purity and impurity (Duschinsky & Lampitt, 2012).  
As this example shows, Moore (2000) and other theorists such as Kristeva 
([1980], 1982), make a methodological misstep in their presumption that 
purity is simply the absence of impurity. This is true of purity in the Hebrew 
Bible (Klawans, 2000), but not of Platonism. The Athenian tells Clinias in 
Plato’s Laws (4.716) that ‘the wicked man is akathartos [unclean] in his 
psuché [life, soul, being], whereas the good man is clean [katharos — opposite 
of akathartos]; and from him that is defiled no good man, nor god, can ever 
rightly receive gifts’. For Plato, deviation from our essential truth is marked as 
steps away from true reality, as the common domain of men and gods. This 
means, as Foucault observes, that for Plato both worldliness and untruth 
‘should be understood on the double register of an impurity to be dispelled and 
a disease to be cured. Purification and cure are mixed together’ ([1983] 2012 , 
p.361). Foucault emphasises that the association between purity and truth, to 
be found in Plato and in other Greek discourses, ‘was to be decisive in the 
history of Western knowledge’ ([1971] 2013, p.228). Yet he insists, in contrast 
to Moore, that this does not mean that purity and impurity will always be 
salient in Western discourses. For example, he draws a contrast between Stoic 
ethics in which ‘the question of purity was nearly nonexistent or, rather, 
marginal’ and ‘the Neoplatonic schools’. The importance of purity to the latter 
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meant that the question of purity ‘became more and more important through 
their influence’ ([1984b] 1997, p.274).  
The influence of Platonism on Western purity and impurity discourses 
complicates Moore’s narrative. He knows this. In a discussion of Buddhism’s 
lack of a discourse of moral purity, Moore observes that ‘in Buddhist 
cosmology all things are composite and transient. They have no eternal self. 
The personality is in a constant state of flux… This set of ideas amounts to a 
complete denial of Platonism. To take this anti-Platonism seriously, to deny 
the possibility of pure essences, and yet construct a doctrine claiming a purity 
relevant to this world would be impossible’ (2000, p.114). The implication is 
that Western purity discourses are as much shaped by an account of 
phenomena as underpinned by essences, lacking mixture or transience, as by 
Biblical purity discourses. This would suggest a rather different theory of 
purity and impurity in Western cultures to that offered by Moore, in which the 
two basic themes of such discourses are an otherworldly sanction and an 
alignment of impurity with evil. Instead, purity and impurity would also, and 
perhaps predominantly we would argue, be shaped by an assessment of 
phenomena in terms of their correspondence or distance with their essence in 
terms of their degree of mixture and/or transience. Purity would not be empty 
of content, but would have properties of its own. 
Indeed, cognitive scientists have found evidence that there are specific 
neurophysiological reactions to the presence of purity which are distinct from 
those associated with the presence or absence of impurity. For example, smells 
that signify purity to a participant are more likely to encourage cooperative 
behaviour and trust than merely the absence of negative smells (Liljenquist et 
al., 2010). When people have typed a virtuous e-mail, they are less likely to 
want to use hand sanitizer than the general population, ‘suggesting that people 
may avoid rinsing away residues of virtue’ as a moral substance distinct from 
the absence of contamination (Lee & Schwartz, 2010, p.1425). As Schnall 
(2011, p.265) puts it, such findings mean purity is ‘more than the simple 
absence of contamination’, and that ‘clean, proper and tidy are more than the 
absence of dirty, disgusting and wrong’. 
We propose that hegemonic constructions, characteristic of the cultural 
heritage of Western societies but not limited to them in contemporary 
globalised society, allocate purity two distinct qualities: it corresponds with its 
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essence, and it is qualitatively homogenous (devoid of heterogeneous, foreign 
or inferior elements). A further property of pure things is that their degree of 
homogeneity or mixture is therefore a measure of their correspondence with 
their essential truth (Duschinsky & Lampitt 2012; Duschinsky & Brown 2013). 
Purity discourses, in short, compare people and things to their essence in 
terms of their degree of mixture. And as even Plato himself acknowledged, 
seemingly despite himself, there is a great deal of social and psychological 
contingency in what phenomena get assigned an essence (termed an ‘Idea’ in 
Plato), and how the purity of the correspondence between phenomenon and 
essence gets judged:  
Parmenides: such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else which is vile and 
paltry; would you suppose that each of these has an Idea distinct from the actual 
objects with which we come into contact, or not? 
Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they appear to 
us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any Idea of 
them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is 
nothing without an Idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run 
away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and 
perish; and so I return to the Ideas of which I was just now speaking [the good, 
the true, etc.], and occupy myself with them. (Plato, Parmenides 130c) 
 
 
Having taken the example of zinc as a starting point, nationalist purity 
discourses offer a useful further case for consideration, since we are less 
inclined to accept the essence imputed as the ground of national identity than 
the element as the ground of zinc metal—although both in part are 
constructions. Discourses of nationhood, in the influential form which 
emerged in early modern Western Europe, are heavily indebted to the 
symbolic resources made available by the Hebrew Bible (Curruthers, 2012). 
Yet the boundaries of the nation are not organised along Biblical lines, and as 
such neither are racial purity and impurity discourses. Rather, it is the 
influence of the Greek concept of essences which has more significant a role to 
play here. A full member of the nation is conceptualised as pure in nationalist 
discourses, in contrast to immigrants and in sharp contrast to ‘mixed-race’ or 
‘retarded’ couples or children (Stubblefield, 2007). In making this judgement, 
nationalist discourses depend upon the assumption that the nation is a trans-
historical essence, instantiated by each true member of the national population 
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within the national territory to the extent that they are devoid of ethnic 
mixture or perceived inferiority.   
In his superb contribution to the special issue, Björn Sonnenberg-Schrank 
states that purity is ‘difficult and delicate… to determine… especially sexual 
and spiritual purity—the purity of the human's body and mind—because their 
boundaries are so fluid and subjective, other than e.g. the purity of chemical 
substances, which is determinable, objective, and a neutral fact. Purity is 
almost always a “fake idea,” a construction with a clear political agenda, one 
that constitutes an inside-outside or pure-impure dichotomy and thereby 
becomes a function of (social) Othering’. This is a powerful theorisation of the 
topic. However, the two examples drawn above, zinc and the nation, allow us 
to finesse Sonnenberg-Schrank’s claim. Whilst generally correct, it is too stark 
to say that purity is ‘almost always a ‘fake idea’—or with Currell that it is a 
‘delusion’, implying that it is mere cultural construction through a contrast 
with the objective and neutral fact of chemical substances. The discourses 
which situate zinc and the nation as pure both impute an essence as the 
ground of existence, and this imputation is by degrees but always a process 
which involves social construction and political agendas. Consider, for 
example, Primo Levi’s ([1975] 1984) essay on zinc in his book The Periodic 
Table, in which he observes the way in which, in Fascist Italy, discourses on 
chemical elements could imbricate with Nazi ideas of racial purity, each 
impacting the meaning of the other.  
Conversely, however, the nation is not merely a ‘fake idea’; this risks an 
idealist fallacy. Nationalist discourses of the nation are not unmoored to any 
sensuous or measurable reality, but are grounded in a variety of socially-
policed and contingently-organised practices. It is these practices which serve 
as the ‘hardware’ for the ‘software’ of nationalist constructions of a racial 
identity as the ever-threatened expression of an essence, threatened by 
admixture. Among the most significant such practices is category-based 
endogamy—only reproducing with individuals of the same category as oneself. 
This involves, for example, the geographical and biopolitical (self-)regulation 
of young women, constructed as a key site for the biological and cultural 
reproduction of the next generation of the nation (Duschinsky 2013a). As 
Janice Pariat suggests in the introduction to her beautiful creative contribution 
to the special issue, ‘the designation “dkhar” implies the drawing of borders of 
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purity in terms of bloodline and lineage’. Another significant piece of the 
‘hardware’ of nationalist purity discourses is the effort to organise and 
administer geographical territories as if they had natural and inevitable 
boundaries. Attention to nationalist discourse in the context of the discursive 
practices which serve as its hardware shows that there is no general alignment 
between nationalism, inside/outside, and pure/impure: ‘From the viewpoint of 
racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There are only 
people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be. The dividing line 
is not between inside and outside but rather is internal to simultaneous 
signifying chains and successive subjective choices’ (Deleuze & Guattari [1980] 
1987, p.197). 
The availability and form of purity and impurity discourses is shaped by 
the scaffolding available for making claims about the truth. In particular, a key 
form of scaffolding is the materiality of sensuous objects. Sonnenberg-Schrank 
follows Sartre ([1943] 1993) in highlighting the instinctive human response of 
disgust towards viscous things, on the basis that they disturb our cherished 
classificatory boundaries and this ‘ambiguity… equals impurity’. He suggests 
that ‘the teenager is situated in a transitional in-between-neither-nor space, 
between the formerly innocent (or pure) child and its opposing, yet 
developmentally inevitable counterpart, the potentially polluted adult, 
between dependence and independence, between undeveloped and fully 
developed sexuality. In the developmental process of a human, the teenager as 
in-between stage corresponds to the viscous’. Sonnenberg-Schrank is right to 
see value in Sartre’s reflections. They are partially correct: viscosity and/or 
ambiguity make a disgust response more likely. However, there is only a 
general association rather than any robust tie between viscous or ambiguous 
(or viscous and ambiguous) phenomena and a perception of impurity, as 
anthropologists and cognitive scientists have shown (Tambiah, 1969; Valeri, 
2000; Stevenson et al,. 2010; Zhong & House, 2013). It is notable that it is 
female teenage sexuality more than male, as Sonnenberg-Schrank observes, 
which is subject to purity/impurity codings: ‘loss of male virginity is treated 
more lightly, in satire and comedy, as boyish fun, half awkward, half 
competitive-aggressive. The loss of female virginity is rather addressed in 
serious, grave terms… the definition of purity as virginity is clearly gendered 
and treats adolescent female sexuality as problematic.’ As such, being in-
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between is not a sufficient explanation for impurity. Though it is a potentially 
useful regularity, it assigns too much causal power to classificatory boundaries 
(O’Brien, 2006; Duschinsky, 2013b).  
Attention to the scaffolding for the erection of an essence against which 
people or things can be judged pure or impure helps us advance beyond realist 
or idealist approaches to purity and impurity. These classifications are never 
merely objective, or merely fake, but are always constructions produced out of 
signifying chains and successive subjective choices within situated practice. 
Currell identifies this in her paper, in considering the way in which 
documentary photography was deployed as a scaffold for the ‘invisible’ role of 
eugenic purity in shaping human bodies and cultures: ‘social-documentary 
photographs accompanying eugenic texts often showed residences as isolated, 
dirty, or in a state of collapse—not to show that occupants needed help or 
housing but as a way of confirming the feeblemindedness that justified 
eugenicists’ demand for segregation and sterilization. Taken out of context, 
however, it would be impossible to discern eugenic intent in these, even where 
we know it certainly exists’. Support for eugenic purity discourses was supplied 
in the course of national policy and discursive practice by photographs, 
signifying chains, which in themselves offer little or no obvious scaffolding. In 
other cases, the scaffolding of purity and impurity discourses may, in itself, 
lend itself to such use, without ever determining it. One such case is the purity 
of colour. 
Colour and the material imagination 
The reasons why whiteness and purity evoke one another, and the limits of this 
association, have been debated by scholars. Some researchers have treated a 
link between purity and whiteness as a cultural universal, others have 
presumed this link to be specific to Western culture, and yet others have 
treated the two terms as simply synonymous (Sibley, 1995; Sherman & Clore, 
2009; Berthold, 2010). A step beyond this debate is to consider closely the 
materiality of whiteness. As we have shown elsewhere, the qualities of 
whiteness as we perceive it facilitate a close association with purity, though 
they certainly do not determine any necessary link: ‘the uniformity of 
whiteness can be used to signify qualitative homogeneity, its emptiness can be 
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mobilised to signify a transparent correspondence between phenomena or 
forms of subjectivity and their originary state, and the immediate visibility of 
any mark suggests a fragile vulnerability which makes any deviation already of 
great magnitude’ (Duschinsky & Brown, 2013). Yet these material qualities can 
have multiple, perhaps even contradictory, meanings. Our sense of what 
whiteness means is shaped by the history of its utilisations within discourse, 
though this is scaffolded by its particular qualities. This conclusion can help 
make sense of Turner’s (1967) survey which found that whiteness has different 
meanings across world cultures, but that there is a family resemblance 
between its different meanings. Whiteness is suited to the evocation of purity, 
but it cannot achieve this by itself: it requires that the link is made within 
situated practices—necessarily and inevitably shaped, like all practice, by 
degrees by relations of power. 
Moore suggests that monotheistic history has been the cause of Western 
purity discourses and that the concept ‘purity’ is itself empty of content. 
Certainly, as Currell observes, ‘purity’ as a quality cannot be touched, even if 
things designated as pure can be. Yet, in his book Water and Dreams, 
Bachelard ([1942] 1983, p.141) has insightfully highlighted that ‘the psychology 
of purification is dependent on material imagination and not on an external 
experience’. Purity is not empty of content because it is not immediately 
present in external experience and therefore stands dependent upon our 
‘material imagination’. Comparing the way purity is linked to whiteness within 
different traditions influential for Western culture can help show that the 
family resemblances linking whiteness to purity, identified by Turner, depend 
upon the ‘material imagination’ of purity as an image of homogeneity and of an 
originary state.  
Isaiah 1:16-18 describes the turn to obedience to God’s will as an act which 
will ‘wash yourselves [rahatzu]; cleanse yourselves [hitzaku — from the root 
zakah]’. Purification is evoked through images of colour transformation: 
‘though your sins are like scarlet, they shall be like snow; though they are red 
like crimson, they shall become like wool’. The process of purification is 
likened by Isaiah to the dyeing of wool or the disturbance of snow, but in 
reverse. The original position and quality is reclaimed through this action, the 
physical impossibility of achieving this raising the question of a miraculous 
partnership between human obedience or repentance and God’s forgiveness. 
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The material imagination of the association between purity and whiteness 
through the image  of a homogenous, originary state is emphasised also in 
verse 13 of Psalm 73 in which the penitent tells God that he or she has ‘kept my 
heart pure [tzikiti — to have kept zakah] and have washed my hands in 
innocence’. Yet, in light of the verse from Isaiah, the material image fights 
against the penitent’s assertion. Is it possible, physically, to make something 
scarlet such that it appears like snow, or something dyed so that it  appears like 
natural wool? This concern, at once theological and necessarily material, 
causes Proverbs 20:9 precisely to wonder: ‘Who can say, "I have kept my heart 
pure; I am clean and without sin"?’. Job (15:14) insists that any such 
transformation must involve a miraculous element: ‘What are mortals, that 
they could be pure [zakeh]?’. By contrast, perhaps, Psalm 119:9 seems to 
suggest that it is possible to become pure through human actions, albeit always 
as a vanishing horizon: ‘How can a young man keep pure [yezakeh] in his 
behaviour? By guarding it in accordance with your word’.  
The material imagination of whiteness as a moral purification in Isaiah 
emphasises the role of God in achieving a true and moral state. By contrast, 
the material imagination of whiteness as purity in Plato’s Philebus is mobilised 
to describe the unmixed orientation of the human towards essences (Ideas) 
rather than the variety of worldly things as the way to achieve the true and 
moral state of human life. This contingent construction of purity has 
contributed to a now-hegemonic cultural formation: in her contribution to the 
special issue, Downes emphasises the significance of ‘the notion of an essential 
self, a thinking self elevated from a decaying body’ for Western 
conceptualisations of death. An early, and important, form of such discourse 
can be found in Plato. In a chapter of the otherwise unpublished Volume 4 of 
the History of Sexuality, Foucault observes that, within a tradition emerging 
with Platonism and later amplified by Christianity, purification is not merely 
the removal of contaminants but the approach to correspondence with the 
essence of the world: ‘there occurs a sort of double action, a withdrawal that 
also reveals’ ([1984a] 1999, p.196). 
In Plato’s Philebus (52d), Socrates starts by asking ‘What kind of thing is 
most closely related to truth?… let us adopt that point of view towards all the 
classes which we call pure. First let us select one of them and examine it’: 
Protarchus: Which shall we select? 
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Socrates: Let us first, if agreeable to you, consider whiteness. 
Protarchus: By all means. 
Socrates: How can we have purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is it the greatest 
and most widespread, or the most unmixed, that in which there is no trace of any 
other colour? 
Protarchus: Clearly it is the most unadulterated. 
Socrates: Right. Shall we not, then, Protarchus, declare that this, and not the 
most numerous or the greatest, is both the truest and the most beautiful of all 
whitenesses? 
Protarchus: Quite right. 
Socrates: Then we shall be perfectly right in saying that a little pure white is 
whiter and more beautiful and truer than a great deal of mixed white.  
Protarchus: Perfectly right. 
Socrates: Well then, we shall have no need of many such examples in our 
discussion of pleasure; we see well enough from this one that any pleasure, 
however small or infrequent, if uncontaminated with pain, is pleasanter and more 
beautiful than a great or often repeated pleasure without purity. 
Protarchus: Most certainly; and the example is sufficient. 
 
Protarchus, then, is convinced that just as whiteness is truer than mixed white, 
so a pleasure which is pure is superior to one which is mixed. Though we leave 
the discussants in their dialogue—a quick exposure—the conclusion Socrates 
will extract is that philosophy, as knowledge of essences, is the pleasure which 
is pure and which must therefore guide our action. Yet other conclusions can 
be drawn using the same logic. Plutarch, the first-century Platonist, addresses 
the same concerns in two existent sections of his Moralia: De E apud Delphos 
(which directly cites Plato’s Philebus) and Quaestiones Romanae. In the 
former section, Plutarch draws out that the content of purity is qualitative 
homogeneity. This is why, he suggests, we start to talk about purity and 
impurity when what is at stake is the extent to which a particular thing 
corresponds solely and singularly with its essence: ‘Unity is simple and pure. 
For it is by the admixture of one thing with another that contamination arises, 
even as Homer somewhere says that some ivory which is being dyed red is 
being “contaminated,” and dyers speak of colours that are mixed as being 
“spoiled”; and they call the mixing “spoiling”. Therefore it is characteristic of 
the imperishable and pure to be one and uncombined’ (De E apud Delphos 20, 
translation Babbitt, 1936).  
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Applying this reflection to whiteness, Plutarch observes that ‘only white, 
therefore, is pure[eilikrinei, separate, absolute], unmixed [amiges, pertaining 
either to material substances or breeding], and uncontaminated [amiantos] by 
dye, nor can it be imitated; wherefore it is most appropriate for the dead at 
burial. For he who is dead has become something simple, unmixed, and pure, 
once he has been released from the body, which is indeed to be compared with 
a stain made by dyeing. In Argos, as Socrates says, persons in mourning wear 
white garments washed in water’ (Quaestiones Romanae 26-7, translation 
Babbitt, 1936). Plutarch’s account here is important and unsettling in both 
how proximate and how distant it is from the purity and impurity discourses 
we use two thousand years later. We, too, still perceive purity as a simple state, 
in which there is no mixture or inferiority. We, too, retain the Platonic thread 
in tending to view the body as a whole as antithetical to purity—in contrast to 
the Hebrew Bible in which only particular body substances and corpses are 
considered impure. Yet we would not wear white garments when in mourning 
as a reflection of the purity of the departed’s imperishable soul, now released 
from the stain of their body. Instead, as Downes rightly observes in her 
contribution to the special issue, we have seen a ‘medicalisation of death, 
which took death out of the home and into the hospital. Rather than being a 
natural part of life, death became something against which one should fight, at 
all costs. This was the advent of the invisible death, a cultural repression that 
remained largely unchallenged until the latter half of the twentieth century ’. 
Attending to Plutarch as a moment within the genealogy of hegemonic 
purity discourses helps disturb our assumptions about the naturalness of our 
purity discourses, in both its proximity and its distance. Contemporary 
scientific discourse, two thousand years later, would assign to the element zinc 
the qualities of being imperishable and uncontaminated, even though 
particular zinc metal must be smelted for it to ever be solely an instantiation of 
this element. Likewise, the nation is allocated the same properties when 
judgements are made using purity and impurity, in twentieth and twenty-first 
century nationalisms, about who is allocated the tacit privileges of whiteness. 
In each case, a material imagination deploys purity in order to address the 
truth of existence. This truth does not need to have a moral meaning; but it is 
well adapted for moral discourse which presumes upon absolutes, built into 
ontology. Benjamin ([1921] 1996, p.265) gestures towards this when he states 
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that ‘the fantastic play of colour is the home of memory without yearning, and 
it can be free of yearning because it is unalloyed’. 
Tara Ward’s beautiful paper on the work of Robert and Sonia Delaunay 
helps deepen our understanding of this relationship between colour and 
purity, alluded to by Benjamin. She notes that both were influenced by 
Chevreul, a nineteenth-century colour theorist who had shown that hues 
opposite one another on the colour wheel make each look purer to the human 
eye when shown together. Whilst the Delaunays’ writings on purity have  been 
generally read as instantiations of an eliminationist rhetoric of ‘pure art’, Ward 
shows that this was far from the case. In fact, their artworks demonstrate that 
pure meanings, aspiring to address intense and absolute experiences of the 
modern world, can be created ‘not by segregation but proximity, not by 
distillation but careful mixing’. Ward concludes that, ‘in short, for the 
Delaunays, pure painting was not a retreat from the world, but a way of 
making its dichotomies and conflicts more visible’. Once again, therefore, we 
can stave off an argument here that purity is a mere construction, and no more 
than a matter of the eye of the beholder—since Chevruel’s discovery was 
precisely that most human eyes are disposed to respond to exposure to 
simultaneous contrasts in a way that increases the perception of purity. The 
Delaunays made use of this discovery in order to address the disjuncture of 
identities, ideological struggles, power structures, and practical congestion of 
modern, urban Paris in their artworks. Ward’s work agrees with the 
perspective elaborated so far, since she shows the role of materiality in even 
abstract reflections on society or religion framed in terms of purity. However, 
Ward’s reflections go one stage further in suggesting that purity-perception is 
a necessarily embodied experience. 
Embodied cognition 
Why is the body so central to hegemonic purity discourses? Moore suggests 
that this is a product of monotheistic morality. However, we have seen that, in 
contrast to the Platonic degradation of the body, the Hebrew Bible is selective 
in assigning impurity codings to particular bodily substances and activities—
and not others. Furthermore, we have seen that the materiality of purity 
inclines discourses and practices in certain directions, though it does not 
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determine them. We wish to present two necessarily-interleaved reasons for 
the centrality of the body to so much purity discourse. First, the body is very 
important in how humans perceive generally. In its material articulations of 
time and space, ‘the body is the architectonics of sense’ (Nancy [2006] 2008 , 
p.25), and thus may serve as both support for and an instrument of purity-
impurity discourses. These discourses can be anchored in and strategically 
deploy the vividness of certain lived experiences: of intact or broken skin; the 
status of objects as touched or untouched; the spatial sense of elements of an 
environment as elevated or grounded, integral or dispersed, still or moving in 
relation to one another. It is impossible to evacuate the body from our 
perceptions of purity and impurity. Ward has shown this conclusively in her 
study of the Delaunays’ artistic practice.  
Research in cognitive science supports this conclusion. Schnall et al. 
(2008), for example, found that making moral judgements in the context of a 
bad smell or a dirty room increases the severity of these judgements; 
information about bodily states was, without their conscious awareness, being 
used by participants to inform their moral reasoning because of the proximity 
between embodied feelings of disgust and judgements about moral purity. 
Eskine et al. (2011) found that disgusting tastes were more likely to stimulate 
severe moral judgements than sweet tastes or water, and that this effect was 
particularly pronounced for those who held conservative as opposed to liberal 
political views. Inbar et al. (2012) replicated this association between 
conservatism and disgust sensitivity with participants from 121 different 
countries. 
Yet if embodied revulsion can be confused with moral judgement, the same 
is true in reverse. Ritter and Preston (2011) found that American Christian 
conservatives showed increased disgust in judging an unpleasant drink after 
writing out a passage from the Qur'an or from Richard Dawkins' The God 
Delusion, but not a control text or from the New Testament. The effect was 
removed if participants were allowed to wash their hands after copying out the 
passage and before rating the unpleasant drink. This latter finding suggestively 
shows the imbrications of cognition with culture in the judgement of purity 
and impurity. One is not base, the other superstructure; they both recursively 
influence each other. Even our very sense of taste is shaped by our political 
views and religious convictions, via the enmeshing of purity discourses with 
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one another at the level of culture and cognition: if we are used to activating 
purity and impurity to judge others according to our beliefs, these themes will 
be more salient and available when our bodies experience an unpleasant or 
disgusting sensation. 
 Thus a second, imbricated factor for the centrality of the body to 
hegemonic discourses of purity and impurity can be proposed to be the body as 
biopolitical object within culture. The body is a key site of social struggle in a 
variety of fields organised through appeal to essence. Discourses on the body 
address the biological, economic, semiotic, and social potentialities of human 
beings, and can therefore be used to make or contest claims about the natural 
or proper stratification or (self-)regulation of particular forms of subjectivity 
(Guattari, [1992] 1995). For instance, discussing the scientific field, Haraway 
(1991, p.204) has observed that ‘the immune system is a map drawn to guide 
recognition and misrecognition of self and other’, rather than simply a means 
of policing a set of pre-existing body boundaries. Scientific study of ‘the 
immune system’ has increasingly revealed the contingency of what are 
generally taken to be natural boundaries, such as inner/outer, mine/yours, 
pure/impure. Antigens, for instance, can potentially be classed within either of 
these poles. Yet, at the same time, metaphors associated with the immune 
system are deployed in social and political discourses to situate the ‘inside’ as 
homogenous and originary compared to an outside, producing a narrative that 
frames a pure self in danger from or the victim of an impure invader (Ansell 
Pearson, 1997; Esposito, [2004] 2008; Hughes, 2005). Purity/impurity 
discourses can be mobilised to facilitate the devaluation, exploitation, 
sequestration, regulation or excision of those phenomena or subjects who 
diverge from what is, in part precisely through this discursive labour, thereby 
taken to be no more than the expression of an essential ideal. 
Agamben ([1995] 1998) has argued that among the most important 
questions addressed to the body in the language of purity and impurity is ‘who 
counts as a full human being, and warrants protections as such?’ (Duschinsky, 
2012). He highlights the significance of the work of Walter Benjamin, who 
suggests that Western society ascribes a certain, tacit ‘purity’ to a person as the 
foundation for their physical inviolability and their entry into the social 
community of human beings: 
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Honour is, as Hegel [Philosophy of Fine Art, [1837] 1975, 327] defined it, ‘the 
extreme embodiment of violability’. ‘For the personal subsistency for which 
honour contends does not assert itself as intrepitude on behalf of a communal 
weal, and the repute of thoroughness in relation to it and integrity in private life. 
On the contrary it contends simply for the recognition and formal inviolability of 
the subject’. This abstract inviolability is, however, no more than the strictest 
inviolability of the physical self, the purity of flesh and blood in which even the 
most secondary demands of the honour code are grounded. For this reason 
dishonour is caused by the shame of a relative no less than by an offence against 
one’s own person... it is only the shield designed to protect man’s physical 
vulnerability. The man without honour is an outlaw. (Benjamin [1925] 1998: 
pp.86-7) 
Benjamin, commenting on Hegel, is suggesting that all humans find 
themselves in a state of physical vulnerability to one another and to their 
environment. A tacit, unmarked purity is allocated to each full member of the 
human community, which warrants them protections within an honour code. 
That these protections are rooted ultimately in the body of the person, and that 
the boundedness of the body is erected as the first and foundational right, is 
revealed by the fact that the actions of others who are associated with one’s 
own body, such as relatives, have the capacity to bring down the barrier of 
protections of the body offered by honour. Turning Benjamin’s reflection to a 
consideration of gender can bring this point further into focus, and continues 
to highlight the significance of embodiment. Annaliese Beth Piraino, in her 
contribution to the special issue, suggests that ‘rape, honor killings, and 
chastity expectations demonstrate the need for men to “purify” male 
dominated societies of women that "drive men" to sexual compulsion’. These 
practices, she suggests, are ‘manifestations of patriarchal fears pertaining to 
the loss of power’. We would wish to add to this that representations of 
purity/impurity particularly serve to instantiate, develop or transform 
divisions between the true, acceptable human and the sub-human. These 
divisions can, in turn, be mobilised to anchor further purity/impurity 
discourses through the production of stock discursive figures, like the ‘cripple’ 
or the ‘whore’. Such figures may be deployed as a ‘narrative prosthesis’ 
(Mitchell & Snyder 2000, 2006), a discursive element that through its 
supposed deficiency imputes a propriety and sufficiency to full human life.   
 The global Slut Walks of 2012 protested the association between 
women, sexual availability, and impurity. Whilst this case offers an example of 
a movement committed against ideals of sexual purity, more fundamentally 
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this case helps interrogate the assumption that we always aspire to purity by 
highlighting the question of why this protest was necessary to contest 
judgements about women, and not about men. It is not generally the dominant 
in society, Bourdieu ([1979] 1984) has observed, who are marked as pure or 
who aspired to be pure. Political and economic elites, if things are going well 
for them, are more likely not to have a purity/impurity coding; it is figures in 
the cultural and religious field—‘dominated among the dominant’ for 
Bourdieu—who have and aspire to further purity; and it is the dominated in 
society who are coded impure.  
Bourdieu observes the same figuration in the organisation of gender 
power. The construction of the feminine as either pure or impure legitimates 
masculine possession, protection and control of women to ensure that 
impurity does not enter; masculinity is situated as relatively pure—and this 
relative purity serves as a tacit norm against which the purity or impurity of 
women is compared ([1998a] 2001, pp.20, 51). Femininity is flagged for 
assessment in terms of purity and impurity, whereas masculinity is not marked 
in this way: ‘Whereas men in contemporary society are often treated as 
retaining a relative and unmarked purity and a status of inviolability no matter 
their heterosexual experiences or practices, the marked social construction of 
their embodiment subjects women to a marked differentiation between pure-
good-proper-clean and impure-bad-wild-dirty’ (Duschinsky, 2013a, p.359). 
 For Bourdieu, individuals are variously categorised as relatively pure, 
or relatively impure, depending on the degree and forms of capital they 
possess. Given the right institutional frame, these possessions can serve as 
‘symbolic capital’, placing the person who possesses it as a relatively true and 
elevated human being. A distinction must therefore be drawn between marked 
and unmarked purity. Unmarked purity characterises dominant subject-
positions not only in their relative privilege in society, but also in their 
privilege not to stand out (Berlant, 1997; Chidester, 2008). Máire MacNeill’s 
penetrating analysis of changing duelling discourses in her contribution to the 
special issue, for example, shows the transition of duelling from an activity 
without a purity/impurity coding into a marked activity ‘at worst on a par with 
drinking and whoring’ since it did not show the ‘expected level of purity of 
thought’ sufficient for the unmarked purity of a gentleman. However, this was 
a matter of degree, and at no point did the duellist become subject to continual 
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surveillance for signs of purity or impurity, in the manner of Sonnenberg-
Schrank’s female teenagers. 
The economics of purity 
As Mackenzie (2004, p.x) has observed, we live in ‘an age scarred by the 
actions of regimes in pursuit of purity’. Yet ‘purity is an ideal that secures 
many of our most deeply felt attachments to our sense of self, our relations 
with others and the ebb and flow of cultural life’. We would add to Mackenzie 
that in our age, also, certain sorts of purity discourses dominate, with 
disturbing results, while others remain unexplored and under-utilised. One 
area of special importance of purity and impurity discourses in contemporary 
society, in the context of the power exercised by global capital, is the use of 
these themes in framing the meaning of money.  
Two of the founding figures of sociology present a potent account of the 
potential impurity of money, which aligns well with the analysis presented 
above. Simmel ([1907] 1989, p.364-7) and Weber ([1922] 1968, p.636) propose 
that money and labour have been historically constructed as corrosive of a 
particular essence imputed to human beings. Economic processes are oriented 
by the transferability and quantifiability of commodities rather than the 
dignity and specificity which may be ascribed to human beings. The ideas of 
these classical theorists can be further specified by the suggestion that this 
impurity is associated with relations such as desire, toil, debt and contract, 
which place the subject in commerce with forces or elements that have been 
constructed as standing outside the various competing and overlapping 
constructions of human essence imputed by the discourses of particular actors 
in society.  
It can be observed that as the ‘toxic debts’ built up by the financial services 
industries have been taken on by the State, the relationship between private 
and public sectors has undergone huge shifts. In the context of state austerity, 
a market uncontaminated by welfare protections is held up as both the ideal 
and the inevitable future. This discourse treats the dehumanising tendencies 
and callous consequences of capital as inevitable, the lesser of two evils 
compared to the distortions to human freedom of state intervention. This 
discourse has its roots in the way that the social and economic problems of the 
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1970s were framed by the Chicago School economists as caused by the lack of 
‘pure’ competition, in accordance with the ‘natural order’ of the market. To 
achieve correspondence with this true market form, not only a scaling back of 
the welfare state but tough penal measures against ‘disorderly’ groups (most 
notably, the working class and ethnic minorities) were recommended, in order 
to ensure that citizens act as the consumers they are taken to be already by 
nature (Foucault, [1979] 2008; Harcourt, 2010). 
In Francesco Di Bernardo’s contribution to the special issue, he explores 
contemporary fictional discourses and interviews with bankers which, in the 
wake of the credit crunch, depict the financial services industry as a Faustian 
pact in which bankers agree to give up morality for the sake of profit: ‘the deal 
and the consequent loss of soul are here metaphors for the transformation of 
society determined by the application of the neoliberal free-market rules’. 
Bankers are, then, impure because their ‘commerce’ is animated by a degree or 
form of greed which wrecks the moral organisation which ‘naturally’ 
characterise a human being. In return for this pact with greed, he suggests, the 
elite of society are able to afford and justify residence in purified gated 
communities, since profit appears to be the result of individual hard work 
rather than of exploitation and selfishness at others’ expense. As Steller and 
Willer (2013, p.5) found in their experiments, ‘increasing an individual’s moral 
self-image buffers against the potentially damaging effects of taking immorally 
earned money, reducing any inhibitions associated with accepting this money’.  
Di Bernardo’s conclusions also resonate with a study by Yang et al. (2012 , 
p.488), which found that ‘the effects of dirty money were not a simple 
combination of dirt and money but rather differed starkly from the 
presentation of either dirt or money without the other’. The researchers 
observed that when people associated money with purity, they were more 
likely to be generous, but when they associated money with impurity, they 
were more likely to be selfish: ‘clean money evokes positive attitudes about 
fair, reciprocal exchange, whereas dirty money evokes notions of exploitation 
and greed’ (2012, p.484). Yet whereas ‘dirty money’ elicits a desire to keep 
funds to oneself, making themes of ‘dirt’ salient before an economic-moral 
choice made participants more likely to be generous. The implication drawn by 
the researchers is that where people see money as inevitably impure, they are 
more likely to give in to greed. By contrast, when their own experiential sense 
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of dirtiness is at stake, ‘exposure to dirt alone seems to have elicited a contrary 
desire for symbolic cleanliness, as reflected in high moral standards’ (2012 , 
p.487). If both the purity or impurity of a person’s sense of self, and the purity 
or impurity of the money that they accrue, influence how generous or callous 
their behaviour will be, then this emphasises the value in further work on this 
topic. For example, in neoliberal capitalist economies, money signifies moral 
purity or impurity in powerful ways through debt and shame, wealth and 
freedom. Debates about the morality of welfare are riddled with eliminationist 
purity and impurity rhetoric.  It can operate as a moral or ethical metric, where 
practices reflect on individuals—so in contemporary politics, ‘hard working 
families’ are rewarded and ‘scroungers’ are punished. A consideration of 
money, morality and judgement underlines their powerful association with 
purity. Such relations further demonstrate the contemporary relevance of this 
subject and its powerful effects on contemporary life, highlighted by the 
contributions to the special issue.   
Concluding comments 
As contributors have shown, practices associated with topics such as money, 
sexuality, artistic expression and propaganda operate within a binary economy 
of purity, where artificial distinctions obscure the enactment of purity. It is at 
these sites, where purity is enacted, that the distorting effects of inequality and 
discrimination can be seen and portrayals of individuals as dirty whores or 
scroungers (and so on) can be challenged. Articles in this special issue 
sensitise us to ways in which ideas of purity relate to privileged telling of 
history and how imperfections in the intelligibility of historical discourse may 
lead to new understandings. Through consideration of colour, they help us to 
define purity in terms of difference and proximity and they push us to explore 
ways of going beyond gendered and classed paradigms of purity. They also 
challenge sanitised presentations of individual ‘purity’ (in this case, the hard 
working elite) by connecting with the operation of economic systems and 
actors. They reveal instances, each one, of the politics of purity.  
Identifying ‘Purity’ as something that engages, that is mixed, that is 
proximal to difference has ethical implications since where relations and 
power are concerned, there are concerns of ethics. We argue that the only 
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alternative to homogeneous states (of ideas, of institutions, of communities of 
people) is the recognition of difference, and the working out of relations within 
that difference, as ethical practice. We have seen that even the Hebrew Bible, 
characterised by Moore as the monolithic source of moral purity discourses, 
contains a plurality of purity discourses, with different means, objects and 
implications. One is eliminationist, concerned to avoid impurity in the Temple; 
the other treats impurity as a means of organising subject positions and 
relationships, in which all humans are impure sometimes and there is no 
necessary moral valence attached to this status. Moore (2000, p.26) argues 
that in its purity and impurity discourses, ‘Christianity… took over ancient 
Hebrew vindictive intolerance, amplified it, and institutionalised it’. Yet if we 
have seen that a plurality of purity discourses operate in the Hebrew Bible, it 
might turn out also that St Paul, in dialogue with this tradition, can provide a 
‘signpost’ towards an alternative ideal of purity practice. As Foucault suggests, 
moral and ethical systems encoded in documents from the past, with 
potentially quite different beliefs and commitments to our own, ‘cannot exactly 
be reactivated but at least constitute, or help to constitute, a certain point of 
view which can be very useful’ ([1984b] 1997, p.261). 
Paul’s letter to Romans was written to a church divided between an 
original majority of Jewish converts to Christianity and a growing number of 
gentile converts (Nanos, 1999). Purity and impurity discourse has become 
invested as a symbolic crunch-point by a community struggling with issues of 
homogeneity and difference. Paul’s injunction to the members of the Rome 
church is that ‘Let us not therefore judge one another any more’: ‘I am 
convinced, being fully persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that nothing is unclean in 
itself; but if anyone regards something as unclean [koinos], then for that 
person it is unclean [koinos]’ (Romans 14:13-14). Paul’s statement is not, as it 
has sometimes been read, a simple and total repudiation of the tradition of 
purity and impurity set out in the Hebrew Bible, and the imposition of a 
radical constructivist perspective in which purity has no meaning or moral 
valence besides in the eye of the beholder. A first piece of evidence for this 
proposition lies in Paul’s choice of object: koinos. Note that Peter, in events of 
Acts 10, states that he ‘has never eaten anything which Jewish laws have 
declared koinos or akathartos’ (Acts 10:14): these terms are distinct from one 
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another, and have a technical meaning in the ritual-legal thought of the time 
(Wahlen, 2005; Rudolph, 2011).  
Koinos means the quality of uncertain cleanness or being without 
particular status as pure or impure (also signifying mutual or common as in 
‘common tongue’). This contrasts to akathartos which means unclean or 
tainted, for instance as used in Matthew 10:1 and elsewhere to describe the 
‘unclean spirits’ banished by Jesus; in Mark 1:40, Jesus explicitly tells a leper 
he has made ‘clean’ to then follow the ritual procedure of biblical purity laws 
following a recovery. Further and stronger evidence is that Verse 20 goes on to 
immediately invalidate a reading of the verses as simple repudiation or radical 
constructivism by stating that ‘everything is indeed clean, but it is wrong for 
anyone to make another stumble by what he eats’. If purity were simply in the 
eye of the beholder, then stumbling would either be impossible or causing it 
would not be wrong.  
Paul is, rather, articulating two principles—one old and one new. One is 
that nothing has any intrinsic property besides goodness (already proposed in 
the Hebrew Bible in Psalm 24:1, which he cites in 1 Corinthians). As such, 
‘food does not commend us to God; for neither if we eat are we the better, nor 
if we do not eat are we the worse’ (1 Cor 8:7). Paul’s principle here is drawn 
from Mark 7.18-20, in which Jesus says, ‘whatever enters man from without, it 
cannot defile him’ but ‘that which comes out of man can defile him’, using this 
as a parable (note the ‘who has ears to hear’ formula in verse 16, signifying a 
metaphor) to emphasise the role of thoughts and motivations in shaping 
ethical practice (Boyarin, 2013). Romans 14:20 articulates this first conclusion 
with the principle that it is wrong to cause someone else to break their 
commitment to an application of purity and impurity discourse regarding diet, 
even if this application is flawed. At the basis of this principle, offering a deft 
theological and pastoral intervention for the divided Roman Church, is an 
acute sociological intuition or observation. Reading verses 14 and 20 together 
suggests that Paul’s point is that communities have different purity and 
impurity discourses available to them in the course of their situated practices, 
and that in the face of this diversity the deployment of these discourses cannot 
be certain or absolute such that one human can legislate for another. What is 
at stake, for Paul, would not then be a repudiation of purity and impurity 
entirely, but a selection among purity discourses in the Hebrew Bible and then 
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a further elaboration and innovation. As such, the text is making an argument 
against the eliminationist and for the potential value in elaborating upon the 
alternate discourse of purity and impurity from the Biblical text. In this latter 
discourse, as we have seen, purity and impurity characterise all humans 
sometimes and no human being absolutely. Taking this approach as a signpost 
for contemporary ethics, including secular ethical practice, purity and impurity 
might not then represent gated communities or patriarchal judgements on 
women’s bodies, but moments within the rhythm of our being situated with, 
related to and constituted by the other. 
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